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owe only the duty of exercising ordinary or reasonable care. 4 Such
care includes the duty to see that the premises are in a reasonably safe
condition 5 and to provide an adequate number of attendants.6
The fact that an emergency arises does not relieve the amusement
owner of the obligation to exercise ordinary care, 7 but it is a circumstance to be considered in determining what is ordinary care.8 Emergencies have made the rule of ordinary care, in its application, less
stringent,9 for men, in times of great stress, are not held to the strict
responsibility of those who act deliberately; 10 "nor will they be penalized because they do not do what, in the light of subsequent events,
or in theory, would have avoided the accident"." The mere nonperformance of an act which, in the light of an emergency, seems
desirable, does not necessarily show a legal duty to perform it, or
render the person failing to do so guilty of negligence. 12 Of course,
where the crisis or strait is brought13 about by the defendant's own
negligence, these rules do not apply.
Although exigency may modify the duty of ordinary care it should
be left to the jury to determine what it should be in any given situation.' 4 The question of negligence is for the jury and it should not
be invaded by the court except in the clearest cases.' 5
A. P. W.

PLEADING AND PRACTIcE-RIGHT OF CORPORATION TO APPEAR

IN ACTION IN PERSON-SECTION 236 OF THE N. Y. CIVIL PRACTICE
ACT.-The Mortgage Commission brought an action to foreclose a
'O'Toole v. South Island Park Ass'n, 206 App. Div. 31, 200 N. Y. Supp.
502 (4th Dept. 1923); Dunning v. Jacobs, 15 Misc. 85, 36 N. Y. Supp. 453
(1895).
5
Rienzi v. Tilyou, 252 N. Y. 97, 169 N. E. 101 (1929).
'Griswold v. Ringling, 221 N. Y. 705, 117 N. E. 1069 (1917) semble;
Ward v. F. R. A. Operating Co., 265 N. Y. 303, 129 N. E. 585 (1935) semble.
'Mississippi C. R. R. v. Aultman, 173 Miss. 672, 160 So. 737 (1936).
' National Life Ins. Co. v. McKenna, 226 Fed. 165 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915).
'Hull v. Tane, 173 So. 701 (Fla. App. 1937); Louisville & N. R R. v.
Wright, 193 Ky. 59, 235 S. W. 1 (1921); Fernald v. French, 121 Me. 4, 115
Atl. 420 (1921); Verney v. Springfield St. Ry., 210 Mass. 63, 96 N. E. 79
(1915).
10 Hartley v. Lasseter, 96 Wash. 407, 165 Pac. 106 (1917).
n Ibid.
"Cf. Draper v. Delaware & H. Canal Co., 118 N. Y. 118, 23 N. E. 131
(1885).
'Caldwell v. Hughes, 18 Tenn. App. 355, 77 S. W. (2d) 117 (1935);
Siegl v. Watson, 181 Wis. 619, 195 N. W. 867 (1923).
" O'Brien v. New York C. R. R., 185 App. Div. 867, 174 N. Y. Supp. 116
(1st Dept. 1919).
'Moore v. Westervelt, 21 N. Y. 103 (1860); Rocky Mountain Fuel Co.
v. Tucker, 72 Colo. 308, 211 Pac. 283 (1922); Reichle v. Philadelphia Rapid
Transit Co., 241 Pa. 1, 88 Atl. 79 (1913).
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mortgage on real property in which the defendant Great Neck Improvement Company, a domestic corporation, served a notice of appearance and an answer containing an affirmative defense subscribed in
its corporate name, by its president, as appearing in person. The plaintiffs now move for an order striking out the answer upon the sole
ground that a corporation cannot so appear, but must appear by a duly
licensed attorney, invoking Section 236 of the Civil Practice Act 1
which deals with appearance in person. The defendants contend that
Article VIII, Section 3 of the New York State Constitution 2 grants to
a corporation the same rights to sue and be sued as natural persons.
Held, corporations are not within the contemplation of the provisions
of Section 236 of the Civil Practice Act which deals with appearance
in person of only natural persons. Mortgage Commission v. Great
Neck Improvement Co., 162 Misc. 416, 295 N. Y. Supp. 107 (1937).
The common law required that every suitor must, except by
special license of the king's letters patent, appear in person to prosecute or defend his suit.3 Corporations were part of the sovereign and
could neither sue nor be sued.4 Later, textwriters report, corporations aggregate were allowed to be party plaintiffs or defendants but
only through attorneys.5 The New York State Constitution, Article
VIII, Section 3, made no mention of this distinction of appearance
by a corporation or a person, but merely stated, "sue and be sued
upon an equal footing with natural persons." In the instant case
Justice Hallinan declared that this provision gives to corporations the
same protection and subjects them to the same liability which would
involve an individual under the same circumstances,6 but in no way
bears upon the Civil Practice Act section which was enacted subsequently 7 and as interpreted relates solely to natural persons.
In other jurisdictions, in which statutes similar to Section 236 of
the Civil Practice Act were involved, the courts have held that a
corporation may not act in legal matters through agents or representatives, but only through licensed attorneys,8 Also, the Supreme

IN. Y. Crv. PRAc. AcT § 236: "A party who is of full age may prosecute
or defend a civil action in person or by attorney unless he has been judicially
declared to be incompetent to manage his 6vn affairs * * *."
IN. Y. STATE CoNsT. art. VIII, § 3: *** * all corporations shall have the
right to sue and shall be subject to be sued in all courts in like cases as natural
persons." Blackstone, in his commentaries, enumerated as one of the attributes
of a corporation, the power to sue or be sued in the corporate name. 1 BL.
Comm. 475.
3 (1937) 37 COL. L. Rav. 313.
'1 Co. Lnv. (1st Am. ed.) § 90, B66.
'1
CHITTY, PLEADING (16th Am. ed. 1844) 551; ComyN's DIGEST,
PLEADER 2, B2.
'Williams v. Village of Port Chester, 97 App. Div. 84, 89 N. Y. Supp.
671 (2d Dept. 1904), aff'd, 183 N. Y. 550, 76 N. E. 1116 (1906).
7 Instant case at p. 418.

'Mullin-Johnson Co. v. Penn. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 9 F. Supp. 175
(D. C. Cal. 1934); Nightingale v. Oregon Cent. Ry., 18 Fed. Cas. 239, No.
10,264 (C. C. Ore. 1873) ; Bennie v. Triangle Ranch Co., 73 Colo. 586, 216 Pac.
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Court of the United States has twice stated that a corporation must
appear by counsel.9 The reason advanced is that these statutes, to
some degree, act as a stop-gap upon the ever-growing invasion of
corporations and laymen into the field of professional activities. Such
an encroachment leads inevitably to the lowering of the zealously
guarded standards of the legal profession.' 0 The judges in construing
statutes of procedure to apply only to natural persons, apparently,
have innermost in their minds the prohibition of corporations from
practicing law for others." It is settled in law that this doctrine
(prohibition of corporate practice of law) is based upon the policy
that corporate practice destroys the confidential and personal relationship of practitioner and client.12 This illegality of practice is not
alone statutory. Statutes prohibiting corporate practice have been
held to be declaratory of the already existing law.' 3 However, when
corporations do not encroach upon the legal field, but defend or
prosecute actions which have arisen, in the first instance, solely with
them, this doctrine of prohibition should not be set up. Any contention that a corporation is functionally incapable of defending an action
in person is untenable. The officers of the corporation are the corpo4
ration itself; their intent is regarded the intent of the corporation.1
In the earlier case of Sellent-Repent Corp. v. Queens Boro Gas
& Elec. Co.,x r the court allowed a corporation to appear in person
and held that "a wide difference exists between acting for oneself by
an inherent faculty, and the employment of another person to act for
and in one's stead. When a corporation does not go outside its own
corporate machinery in the performance of a corporate act, it is acting
718 (1923) ; Nixon, Ellison & Co. v. Southwestern Ins. Co., 47 Ill. 444 (1868) ;
Nispel v. Western Union Ry., 64 Ill. 311 (1872); Union Pacific Ry. v. Homey,
5 Kan. 340 (1870) ; Cobb v. Judge of Superior Court, 43 Mich. 289, 5 N. W.
309 (1880); Cary & Co. v. Satterlee & Co., 166 Minn. 507, 208 N. W. 408

(1926) ; In re Richards, 333 Mo. 907, 63 S. W. (2d) 672 (1933) ; N. J. Photo

Engrav. Co. v. Schonert & Sons, Inc., 95 N. J. Eq. 12, 122 At. 307 (1923).
' 9 Wheat. 738, 6 L. ed. 204 (U. S. 1824) ; 14 Pet. 60, 10 L. ed. 354 (U. S.
1840).

" Hicks and Katz, The Practice of Law by Laymen and Lay Agencies
(1931) 41 YALE L. J. 72.

1CONN. GEN. STAT. (1933)

§ 5345; ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. (1933) c. 32,
1926) § 1076; PA. STAT. ANN. (1936)
tit. 17, § 1608; State v. Merchants' Protective Corp., 105 Wash. 12, 177 Pac.
694 (1919) ; People v. Merchants' Pr6tective Corp., 189 Cal. 531, 209 Pac. 363
(1922). Mr. Justice Brandeis predicted years ago, that the individual would
be engulfed by the corporation unless remedial steps promptly were taken.

§§411, 412;

OHIo GEN. CODE (Page,

FRAENiEL, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS, MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF MR. JUSTICE
BRANDEIS (1935).
'In
Matter of Co-Operative Law Co., 198 N. Y. 479, 92 N. E. 15 (1910);
Wormser, Corporations and the Practice of Law (1936) 5 FORDHAM L. REV.
207.
S Meisel
& Co. v. Nat. Jewelers Board of Trade, 90 Misc. 19, 152 N. Y.
Supp. 913 (1915).
" STEVENS, CORPORATIONS (Horn Book Series 1936) 319; People v. Canadian Fur Trappers Corp,. 248 N. Y. 159, 161 N. E. 455 (1927).
" 160 Misc. 920, 290 N. Y. Supp. 887 (1936).
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in person and upon an equal footing with a natural person, including
the right to sue in person." 1 6 The corporation when acting through
its duly constituted officers is acting in person as much as a natural
person who himself performs acts on his own behalf, 17 and to deny
the corporation the right to appear in our courts to prosecute and
defend its own legitimate actions is to unjustly penalize the
corporation.
H.K.

SALES-IMPLIED WARRANTY-WORK, LABOR AND SERVICES.Defendant employed plaintiff, a woman, as a domestic in his household. As compensation he agreed to pay her a sum of money per
month and to furnish her with food and lodging. Defendant accordingly purchased for plaintiff's consumption a quantity of ham and
pork which plaintiff prepared and ate, following which she became ill
allegedly due to an infection with trichinae of the food. Plaintiff's
complaint was based on the theory of a sale of the food by defendant
to her with a consequent implied warranty that such food was reasonably fit for consumption and contending that the consideration for
such sale consisted in the services rendered by plaintiff to defendant.
Plaintiff failed to allege negligence in her complaint. Held, complaint
insufficient to state a cause of action since transaction between parties
did not constitute a sale. Haag v. Klee, 162 Misc. 250, 293 N. Y.
Supp. 266 (1936).
It is rare that any change of property for a consideration takes
place today without some warranty as to quality or utility of the commodity sold. This warranty may be either express or implied.'
Under both the common law 2 and by statute 3 upon the sale of provisions for human consumption there arises an implied warranty of
wholesomeness and fitness 4 because of the reliance by the vendee
upon the vendor's skill and judgment in the selection of goods that
Ibid.
10th St. & 5th, Inc. v. Naughton, 163 Misc. 437, 296 N. Y. Supp. 952
(1937), plaintiff, landlord-domestic corporation, instituted summary proceedings
without counsel. Contra: Finox Realty Corp. v. Lippman, 163 Misc. 870,
296 N. Y. Supp. 945 (1937).
'e
21

SALES (2d ed. 1934) § 166.
Van Bracklin v. Fonda, 12 Johns. 468 (N. Y. 1815); Moses v. Mead, 5
Denio 617 (N. Y. 1846); Divine v. McCormick, 50 Barb. 116 (1867).
'N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 96.
'WHITNEY, SALES (2d ed. 1934) § 173.
'WHrrNEY,

